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In this paper we consider open-loop Nash equilibria of the linear-quadratic
differential game. In Engwerda (1997) both necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for existence of a solution for as well the finite-planning horizon case as
well the infinite-planning horizon case were presented. Here we will consider
computational aspects of this problem. In particular we consider conver-
gence aspects of the finite-planning horizon solution if the planning horizon
expands. An algorithm is presented to calculate all equilibria of the infinite-
planning horizon case. Furthermore sufficient conditions on the system pa-
rameters are presented, which guarantee the existence of a unique solution
for both the finite as the infinite horizon problem.
Keywords: Linear quadratic differential games, open-loop Nash equilibria,
solvability conditions, Riccati equations
1 Introduction
The last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several prob-
lems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in
the area of environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordina-
tion this is a very natural framework to model problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw
et al. (1991), Mäler (1992), Kaitala et al. (1992) and Dockner et al. (1985),
Tabellini (1986), Fershtman et al. (1987), Petit (1989), Levine et al. (1994),
van Aarle et al. (1995), Neck et al. (1995), Douven et al (1996)). Partic-
ularly in macro-economic policy coordination problems, the open-loop Nash
strategy is often used as a benchmark to evaluate different control strate-
gies. In Engwerda (1997) several aspects of open-loop Nash equilibria are
studied of the standard linear-quadratic differential game as considered by
Starr and Ho in (1969). Both necessary and sufficient conditions for ex-
istence of a unique solution for the finite-planning horizon case are given,
and it is shown that there exist situations where the set of associated Ric-
cati differential equations has no solution, whereas the problem does have
an equilibrium. Furthermore, conditions are given under which this strategy
converges if the planning horizon expands, and a detailed study of the infi-
nite planning horizon case is given. In particular it is shown that, in general,
the infinite horizon problem has no unique equilibrium and that the limit of
the above mentioned converged strategy may be not an equilibrium for the
infinite planning horizon problem.
In this paper we focus on the computational aspects of this problem. The
aim of this paper is on the one hand to make clear that infinite horizon open-
loop Nash equilibria can be relatively easily calculated. On the other hand it
presents conditions on the system parameters from which one can conclude
a priori existence of open-loop equilibrium strategies.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we start by stating the
problem analysed in this paper and recall some basic results. In section three,
we present a numerical algorithm to verify existence and to calculate solu-
tion(s). We will see that the algorithm resembles a computational algorithm
to calculate the solution of the linear quadratic regulator problem using the
Hamiltonian approach which traces back to MacFarlane (1963) and Potter
(1966) (see also e.g. Kučera (1991)). In section four we consider conditions
on the system parameters which guarantee existence of a solution. The paper
ends with some concluding remarks.
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2 Preliminaries
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called
players) try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion.
Each player controls a different set of inputs to a single system, described by
a differential equation of arbitrary order. We assume that both players have
to formulate their strategy already at the moment the system starts to evolve
and this strategy can not be changed once the system runs. So, the players
have to minimize their performance criterion based on the information that
they only know the differential equation and its initial state. We are looking
now for combinations of pairs of strategies of both players which are secure
against any attempt by one player to unilaterally alter his strategy. That is,
for those pairs of strategies which are such that if one player deviates from his
strategy he will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this problem is
well-known as the open-loop Nash non-zero-sum linear quadratic differential
game (see e.g. Starr and Ho (1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Abou-Kandil
and Bertrand (1986) or Başar and Olsder (1995) and the references quoted
in this book). Formally the system we consider is as follows:
ẋ = Ax+B1u1 +B2u2, x(0) = x0, (1)
where x is the n-dimensional state of the system, ui is an mi-dimensional
(control) vector player i can manipulate, x0 is the initial state of the system,
A,B1, and B2 are constant matrices of appropriate dimensions, and ẋ denotes
the time derivative of x.











in which matrix Ri is positive definite, Kif is semi-positive definite, Qi is
semi-positive definite and additionally is positive definite w.r.t. the control-
lability subspace < A,Bi >, i = 1, 2.
Note that usually in literature each player’s performance criterion also in-
cludes a cross term, penalizing the control efforts of the other player. Since,
however, this cross term does not play a role in the analysis of open-loop
Nash equilibria, we dropped this term here.
From Engwerda (1997) we recall the following results.
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Let M denote the with this game associated Hamiltonian matrix
M :=










i . Then, using the following notation:
H(tf) := W11(tf ) +W12(tf )K1f +W13(tf )K2f ,
with W (tf ) = (Wij(tf )) {i, j = 1, 2, 3; Wij ∈ Rn×n} := exp(Mtf ), and
P :=

 I 0 00 0 0
0 0 0

 ; Q :=







The two-player linear quadratic differential game (1) has a unique open-loop
Nash equilibrium for every initial state if and only if matrix H(tf ) is invert-
ible. Moreover, the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution as well as the asso-
ciated state trajectory can be calculated from the linear two-point boundary
value problem
ẏ(t) = −My(t), with Py(0) +Qy(tf ) = (xT0 0 0)T . 
Next, consider the following set of coupled asymmetric Riccati-type differen-
tial equations:
K̇1 = −ATK1 −K1A−Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2; K1(tf ) = K1f (2)
K̇2 = −ATK2 −K2A−Q2 +K2S2K2 +K2S1K1; K2(tf ) = K2f (3)
Let Ki(t) satisfy this set of Riccati equations and assume that player i uses
the strategy
u1(t) = −R−111 BT1 K1(t)Φ(t, 0)x0 (4)
u2(t) = −R−122 BT2 K2(t)Φ(t, 0)x0, (5)
where Φ(t, 0) is the solution of the transition equation Φ̇(t, 0) = (A−S1K1(t)−




If the set of Riccati equations (2,3) has a solution then the two-player linear
quadratic differential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for
every initial state.
Moreover, the equilibrium strategies are then given by (4,5). 
Moreover, it was shown in an example that there exist situations where the
set of Riccati differential equations (2,3) does not have a solution, whereas
there exists an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the game. This raises the
question what the relationship is between solvability of the set of Riccati
equations and existence of an equilibrium for the game. The next theorem
provides an answer to this question
Theorem 3:
The following statements are equivalent:
1) For all tf ∈ [0, t1] there exists a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for
the two-player linear quadratic differential game (1) defined on the interval
[0, tf ].
2) H(t) is invertible for all tf ∈ [0, t1].
3) The set of Riccati differential equations (2,3) has a solution on [0, t1]. 
The above theorem shows that for both computational purposes and for
a better theoretical understanding of the open-loop problem it would be nice
to have a global existence result for the set of Riccati differential equations
(2,3). In section four we will present some sufficient conditions.
In our analysis of convergence properties of the equilibrium strategy and the
infinite horizon case, the set of M-invariant subspaces plays a crucial role.
Therefore we introduce a separate notation for this set:
Minv := {T |MT ⊂ T }.
In particular the with (2,3) associated set of algebraic Riccati equations
0 = −ATK1 −K1A−Q1 +K1S1K1 +K1S2K2;








K ∈ Minv|K ⊕ Im





Here the symbol ⊕ is used to denote the sum of subspaces.
Note that elements in the set Kpos can be calculated using the set of matrices
Kpos :=
{
K ∈ IR3n×n|ImK⊕ Im





The exact result on how all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated is given
in the next theorem. Here we use the notation M |K to denote the restric-
tion of the linear transformation induced by M to the subspace K (see e.g.
Lancaster et al. (1985, p.142)). Furthermore we use the notation σ(X) to
denote the spectrum of a matrix X.
Theorem 4:
(ARE) has a real solution (K1, K2) if and only ifK1 = Y X
−1 andK2 = ZX−1






Moreover, if the control functions u∗i (t) = −R−1ii BTi KiΦ(t)x0 are used to con-
trol the system (1), the spectrum of the closed-loop matrix A−S1K1−S2K2
coincides with σ(−M |K). 
The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix.
Note that every element of Kpos defines exactly one solution of (ARE). Fur-
thermore, this set contains only a finite number of elements if the geometric
multiplicities of all eigenvalues ofM is one (see e.g. Lancaster and Tismenet-
sky (1985)). So, in that case we immediately conclude that (ARE) will have
at most a finite number of solutions.
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Now, we consider the question how the open-loop equilibrium solution changes
when the planning horizon tf tends to infinity. To study convergence prop-
erties of the equilibrium solution for the game, it seems reasonable to require
that problem (1) has a properly defined solution for every finite planning
horizon. Therefore we make the following well-posedness assumption (see
theorem 1)
H(tf ) is invertible for all tf < ∞. (6)
Of course, this assumption is difficult to verify in practice. It stresses once
more the need to find general conditions under which the set of Riccati dif-
ferential equations (2,3) will have a solution on (0,∞).
To derive general convergence results we define first.
Definition 5:
M is called dichotomically separable if there exist subspaces V1 and V2 such
that MVi ⊂ Vi, i = 1, 2, V1 ⊕ V2 = IR3n, where dim V1 = n, dim V2 = 2n,
and moreover Re λ > Re µ for all λ ∈ σ(M |V1), µ ∈ σ(M |V2). 
Theorem 6:
Assume that the well-posedness assumption (6) holds.





 ⊕ V2 = IR3n, then
K1(0, tf ) → Y0X−10 , and K2(0, tf ) → Z0X−10 .







Next we consider the case that the performance criterion player i = 1, 2




The information structure is similar to the finite-planning horizon case. Each
player only knows the initial state of the system and has to choose a con-
trol for the entire infinite time horizon. So, the actions are now described
as functions of time, where time runs from zero to infinity. Since we only
like to consider those outcomes of the game that yield a finite cost to both
7







, t ∈ [0,∞)| lim
tf→∞
Ji(u1, u2) < ∞, i = 1, 2.}
Note that a necessary condition for this set to be nonempty is that in the
system both (A,B1) and (A,B2) are stabilizable. From now on, we will as-
sume that the system satisfies these stabilizability conditions.
Moreover, we require that our open-loop equilibrium strategies allow for a
feedback synthesis. That is, the closed-loop dynamics of the game can be
described by: ẋ(t) = Fx(t); x(0) = x0 for some constant matrix F .
In the appendix we prove that:
Theorem 7:
The infinite-planning horizon two-player linear quadratic differential game






and only if there exist K1 and K2 that are solutions of the algebraic Riccati
equations (ARE) satisfying the additional constraint that the eigenvalues of
Acl := A− S1K1 − S2K2 are all situated in the left half complex plane.
In that case, the strategy
ui(t) = −R−1ii BTi KiΦ(t, 0)x0, i = 1, 2,
where Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equation Φ̇(t, 0) = AclΦ(t, 0); Φ(0, 0) =
I, is an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy.
Moreover, the costs obtained by using this strategy for the players are xT0Mix0, i =
1, 2, where Mi is the unique positive semi-definite solution of the Lyapunov
equation
ATclMi +MiAcl +Qi +K
T
i SiKi = 0, (7)

Combination of the results from theorem 4, 6 and 7 yields then
Corollary 8:
Assume that the planning horizon tf in the differential game (1) tends to
infinity and the following conditions are satisfied
1. H(tf ) is invertible for all tf ;
8






 ⊕ V2 = IR3n
4. Re λ > 0,∀λ ∈ σ(M |V1).
Then the unique open-loop Nash equilibrium solution converges to a (sta-
tionary) strategy
u∗i (t) = −R−1ii BTi KiΦ(t, 0)x0, i = 1, 2,
where Φ(t, 0) satisfies the transition equation Φ̇(t, 0) = (A−S1K1−S2K2)Φ(t, 0);
Φ(0, 0) = I.
In these equations the constant matrices Ki, i = 1, 2, can be calculated from
the eigenspaces of matrix M (see theorem 6). Moreover, the strategies will
stabilize the closed-loop system and are also equilibrium solutions to the in-
finite planning horizon game. 
3 Computational aspects and some illustra-
tive examples
The above considerations yield the following numerical algorithm to verify
whether this two-player game has an open-loop equilibrium. Moreover, if
such an equilibrium exists, this algorithm immediately yields the appropri-
ate control strategies. Note that the assumptions we made thus far on the
system imply that the system should satisfy the following conditions: Qi ≥ 0,
Ri > 0, (A,Bi) stabilizable and (Qi, A) detectable. Provided these assump-
tions hold we have
Algorithm 9:
Step 1 : Calculate M :=







Step 2 : Calculate the spectrum of matrix M.
If the number of positive eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities )
is less than n, goto Step 5.
Step 3 : Calculate all M invariant subspaces K ∈ Kposfor which Reλ > 0 for all
λ ∈ σ(M |K). If this set is empty, goto Step 5.
Step 4 : Let K be an arbitrary element of the set determined in Step 3.






Denote K1 := Y X
−1and K2 := ZX−1. Then
u∗i (t) := −R−1i BTi KiΦ(t)x0 is an open− loop Nash equilibrium strategy.
The spectrum of the corresponding closed− loop matrix A− S1K1 − S2K2
equals σ(−M |K).
If the set determined in step 3 contains more elements one can repeat
this step to calculate different equilibria.
Step 5 : End of algorithm.
One remark we like to make here is that although the algorithm may yield






structures for the eigenvalues of the closed-loop system.
In the next example we illustrate the algorithm. In particular the example


































, and R2 = 1. Note that matrix A is
stable, and thus (A,Bi), i = 1, 2, is stabilizable. Furthermore, both Qi and
Ri are positive definite. So, all assumptions we made on the system and the
performance criteria are satisfied.
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0.1 0 1 1 1 0
0 2 1 2 0 0
1 0 −0.1 0 0 0
0 0.1 0 −2 0 0
1 1 0 0 −0.1 0




The second step is to calculate the spectrum of M . Numerical calcula-
tions show that M = TJT−1, where J is a diagonal matrix with entries




0 0.2724 −0.6261 −0.0303 −0.1714 0.3326
0 0.7391 0.5368 −0.0167 0.3358 0.0633
0 0.1181 −0.5405 0.0154 −0.6473 −0.2433
0 0.0176 0.0176 0.0262 0.0155 0.0119
0 0.4384 −0.0771 0.0239 0.6207 −0.2897




We see that M has six different eigenvalues, three of them are positive. So,





= 3 different equilibrium strategies.
We proceed with step 3 of the algorithm. Introduce the following notation
T =: (T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6). First consider K1 := (T2 T3). The first 2x2 block





. This matrix is invertible.
So, K1 is an element of Kpos for which σ(M |K1) = {2.2073, 1.0584}. That
is, it satisfies all conditions mentioned in step 3 of the algorithm. So, it
is an appropriate element. In a similar way it can be verified that also
K2 := (T2 T5) and K3 := (T3 T5) are appropriate elements. So, step 3 yields
three M invariant subspaces satisfying the conditions.
In step 4 we calculate the actual equilibrium strategies. From step 3 we
have that there are three different equilibrium strategies. We will calculate




















where X,Y and Z are 2x2 matrices.




















sponding open-loop Nash strategy is then u∗i (t) := −R−1i BTi KiΦ(t)x0. The
spectrum of the corresponding closed-loop matrix A − S1K1 − S2K2 equals
{−1.0584,−0.1648}. 
The next example illustrates the phenomenon that there exist situations in
which the finite planning horizon game always has an equilibrium and, even
stronger, this strategy converges if the planning horizon expands, whereas


































, and R2 = 1. Note that (A,Bi), i =
1, 2, is stabilizable and both Qi and Ri are positive definite. So, again, all
assumptions we made on the system and the performance criteria are satis-
fied.
Next we calculate M and its spectrum. Numerical calculations show that
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0 0 0 0 0
0 1.7978 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1.8823 0 0 0
0 0 0 −0.0319 0 0
0 0 0 0 −0.4418 + 0.1084i 0







0 0.7271 0.3726 0.0410 −0.0439− 0.0222i −0.0439 + 0.0222i
0 0.1665 0.2013 −0.1170 0.1228 + 0.0699i 0.1228− 0.0699i
0 0.2599 −0.4222 0.0423 −0.0833− 0.0236i −0.0833 + 0.0236i
0 0.0008 −0.0012 −0.0060 −0.0033− 0.0049i −0.0033 + 0.0049i
0 0.3194 −0.6504 −0.0786 0.1522 + 0.0558i 0.1522− 0.0558i




With the following notation T =: (T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6) we see that M is di-
chotomically separable if we choose V1 := (T2 T4) and V2 := (T1 T3 Re(T5) Im(T5)).
Note that σ(M |V1) = {1.7978,−0.0319} and σ(M |V2) = {−522 ,−1.8823,−0.4418±
0.1084i}.





. Numerical calculation shows that
with these choices for the final cost, the determinant of H(t) always differs
from zero. That is, H(t) is invertible for every positive t. So, the finite-
planning horizon problem has a unique equilibrium for every tf .
On the other hand, this implies that the well-posedness assumption (6) is sat-







3n, it is clear from theorem 6 that the equilibrium solution con-



























The eigenvalues of the closed-loop system (1) using the converged open-loop
strategies u∗i (t) = −R−1ii BTi KiΦ(t)x0, i = 1, 2, are {−1.7978, 0.0319}. So, the
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converged equilibrium solution is not a ”stabilizing solution”.
Next, use algorithm 6 to calculate equilibrium solution(s) for the infinite
horizon game. We see that in step 2 the algorithm terminates. There exist
no solutions to the infinite planning horizon game.
So we conclude that although the finite planning horizon game has always a
solution and, even stronger, the corresponding equilibrium solution converges
if the planning horizon expands, this converged strategy is not an equilibrium
solution of the infinite-planning horizon game. 
4 Some sufficient conditions
In the previous sections we presented both necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for existence of open-loop Nash equilibria in terms of the Hamiltonian
matrix associated with this game, M =

 −A S1 S2Q1 AT 0
Q2 0 AT

. Now, these con-
ditions are rather technical and they do not provide much insight into the
question under which conditions on the system parameters one may expect
that an equilibrium exists or, even more, under which conditions on the sys-
tem parameters there will be a unique solution. From an application point of
view these are rather relevant questions, and therefore we will consider these
questions in this section in some more detail and present some preliminary
results.
First, since the scalar case is often used in applications, we recall from Eng-
werda (1997) the following result (to stress the fact that we are dealing with
the scalar case, the system parameters are put in lower case)
Theorem 12:
Assume that s1q1 + s2q2 > 0.
Then, the finite planning horizon open-loop Nash equilibrium solution con-
verges to the (stationary) strategy:








, i = 1, 2, and µ =
√
a2 + s1q1 + s2q2.
Moreover, these strategies are the unique solution to the infinite-planning
horizon open-loop problem. 
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Another case in which we can conclude that there will be at least one solution
is if, roughly spoken, either the weight matrices Qi or the matrices Si are
proportional. That is assume that there exist matrices S and Ci, i = 1, 2,
where C1 is invertible, such that either one of the following two properties
holds:
I. 1)Si = SCi, i = 1, 2; 2)A
TCi = CiA
T , i = 1, 2; 3)S + ST ≥ 0;
4)C1Q1 + C2Q2 + (C1Q1 + C2Q2)
T ≥ 0; 5)C1K1f + C2K2f + (C1K1f + C2K2f )T ≥ 0.
II. 1)Qi = CiS, i = 1, 2; 2)A
TCi = CiA
T , i = 1, 2; 3)S + ST ≥ 0;
4)S1C1 + S2C2 + (S1C1 + S2C2)
T ≥ 0; 5)K1fC1 +K2fC2 + (K1fC1 +K2fC2)T ≥ 0.
Straightforward multiplication shows then that, e.g. under the assumption
that condition I holds, we can factorize M as M = V JV −1, where
J =





 and V =


















= (I 0 0)eJtf

 IC1K1f + C2K2f
K2f



















is invertible for all tf ∈ [0, t1] if and only if the Riccati differential equation
K̇ = −ATK −KA− (C1Q1 +C2Q2) +KSK; K(tf ) = C1K1f +C2K2f (9)
has a solution on [0, t1]. Feucht showed in (1994, lemma 7.1) that under the
assumptions I.(3-5) this equation (9) has a solution. So, we conclude:
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Theorem 14:
In case either one of the conditions I or II holds then the finite planning
horizon game has a unique equilibrium. 
Feucht also proved this theorem in (1994) without making the invertibil-
ity assumption on C1. He showed the correctness of this theorem by a direct
analysis of the set of Riccati equations (2, 3).
Note that by considering in condition II the case C1 = I, C2 = αI, α > 0,
and S a semi-positive definite matrix we reobtain the case that Q1 = αQ2 as
studied by Abou-Kandil et al in (1986).
The next theorem shows that in the above mentioned particular case it is
also possible to conclude that the infinite planning horizon game has at least
one solution. The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 15:
In case either S1 = αS2 or Q1 = αQ2 (α > 0), the infinite planning horizon
game has at least one equilibrium. In case matrix A additionally is stable,
the game has a unique equilibrium. 
In particular we deduce by combining the results of these last two theo-
rems 14 and 15 with corollary 8 that
Corollary 16:
Assume that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. matrix A is stable






 ⊕ V2 = IR3n
Then, both the finite and infinite planning horizon game have a unique
equilibrium solution. Furthermore, if the planning horizon expands the finite




In this paper we presented an algorithm from which easily can be deduced
whether or not the infinite planning horizon linear quadratic game has an
open-loop Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the algorithm immediately gives
the equilibrium strategies if they exist. A similar algorithm is also used in
the study of the corresponding regulator problem. In fact various improve-
ments have been suggested in literature to improve the numerical stability
of that algorithm, which might also be relevant for our algorithm (see e.g.
Laub (1979), Paige et al. (1981), Van Doorn (1981) and Mehrmann (1991)).
Since, however, up to now usually game-theoretic analysis is restricted to
small models (from a computational point of view), and nowadays good com-
puter packages exist to compute eigenvectors, eigenvalues and the inverse of
a matrix we view this as a subject that maybe in the future might be worth
to elaborate.
A more important subject is, in our opinion, to find conditions on the system
matrices from which one can conclude a priori whether or not the game will
have a solution. That is to develop a better intuition on these games. We
presented some sufficient conditions which, roughly spoken, say that if either
the Qi of Ri matrices are proportional then both the finite and infinite hori-
zon game always have a solution. Moreover we showed that in case matrix A
is additionally stable, the equilibrium strategy of the finite planning horizon
game converges to the unique equilibrium strategy of the infinite planning
horizon game. This, under a mild assumption that the cost on the final state
in the finite planning horizon problem are chosen appropriately. It will be
clear that this is only a preliminary result and that one may hope to find
more general results.
We conclude this paper by noting that the results obtained here can be
straightforwardly generalized to the N-player case.
Appendix
Proof of theorem 7:
The ”⇐”-part of the theorem can be found in theorem 12 of Engwerda.
In fact most of the ⇒”-part was also proved in this theorem. Using the
notation of that proof we recall that in particular it was shown that the
17
optimal strategies ūi(t), i = 1, 2, satisfy





T (s−t)Qixū(s)ds. So, xū(s) satisfies
ẋū(t) = Axū(t)− S1z1,x0(t)− S2z2,x0(t); x(0) = x0. (11)
Note that by assumption for arbitrary x0, x(t) and zi,x0(t) converge to zero.
Next, introduce the matrices Ki = (zi,e1(0)...zi,en(0)), i = 1, 2, and X =
(xū,e1 ...xū,en) where ei denotes the i
th unit vector in Rn and xū,ei denotes the
optimal trajectory corresponding with the initial state x(0) = ei. From (11)
it follows now immediately that X satisfies the equation





T (s−t)QiX(s)ds. Now, due to our assumption on the consid-
ered control functions, the solution X(s) of this equation is an exponential
function. So, X(s+t) = X(s)X(t), for any s, t. Using this, it is easily verified
that the above differential equation can be rewritten as
Ẋ(t) = AX(t)− S1K1X(t)− S2K2X(t); X(0) = I. (13)
So, obviously X(t) = e(A−S1K1−S2K2)t solves this equation (12). Furthermore,
since due to our assumptions X(t) converges to zero, it follows that matrix
A− S1K1 − S2K2 is stable. Next we show that Ki solve (ARE). We have:

























































Similarly it can be shown that also −ATK2−K2A−Q2+K2S2K2+K2S1K1 =
0.
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Which proves the claim. 
Proof of theorem 15:
Consider the factorization (8) of M . Since by assumption (A,Bi) is stabi-
lizable, Ri is positive definite and (A,Qi) is detectable (which follows im-
mediately from our assumption on Qi), there exist matrices K̄ and L̄ such
that
AT K̄ + K̄A− K̄SK̄ + (Q1 + αQ2) = 0
and, dually,
AL̄+ L̄AT − L̄(Q1 + αQ2)L̄+ S = 0
which additionally satisfy, σ(A−SK̄) ⊂ C− and σ(−AT+(Q1+αQ2)L̄) ⊂ C+
(see e.g. Kailath (1980)).

































−(A− SK̄) 0 0






























 (−AT + (Q1 + αQ2)L̄).
Then, in particular it follows that matrix X has to satisfy −(A − SK̄)X =
19
−X(−AT + (Q1 + αQ2)L̄).
Since σ(A−SK̄)∩σ(−AT +(Q1+αQ2)L̄) = ∅, it follows that this Lyapunov


















 is independent of the vectors
from the other two invariant subspaces, it follows that X0 is invertible. Fur-
thermore, using the same arguments as above, it follows from the equation
−(−AT + (Q1 + αQ2)L̄)Y0 = −Y0(A− SK̄),
that Y0 = 0.






 X0 0 00 Y −αI
Z0 Z I

, and J3 :=





Substitution of J into (14) shows that
M










Since X0 is invertible, we conclude that the set mentioned in step 3 of al-
gorithm 9 is nonempty. That is, the infinite horizon game has at least one
equilibrium solution.
From the above arguments it is moreover clear, that in case matrix A is sta-
ble, there exist no more invariant subspaces corresponding with just unstable
eigenvalues than the one we just constructed, which completes the proof. 
References
Aarle B. van, Bovenberg L. and Raith M., 1995, Monetary and fiscal pol-
icy interaction and government debt stabilization, Journal of Economics 62,
20
111-140.
Abou-Kandil H. and Bertrand P., 1986, Analytic solution for a class of linear
quadratic open-loop Nash games, International Journal of Control 43, 997-
1002.
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